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Abstract In this paper, I discuss the conceptualist claim that we cannot speak of per-
ceptual content unless we assume it is objective content. The conceptualist argues that only
conceptual content can meet the requirement of being objective, so that the view that
perceptual experience has nonconceptual content is not tenable. I start out by presenting
the argument from objectivity as it can be found in McDowell (Mind and world, Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, 1994b). I then present the following objections: First, per-
ceptual objectivity cannot be due to the perceiver’s conception of objectivity; and second,
even nonconceptual capacities of the individual cannot and need not be appealed to in
order to account for objective perceptual content.
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1 Some Background
The argument I discuss here is taken from the debate between conceptualism and non-
conceptualism over the question of whether the content of perceptual experience is con-
ceptual or nonconceptual.1 That experience has nonconceptual content is typically taken to
mean that I can have a certain experience even if I do not possess the concepts that would
specify its content. By contrast, to say that experience has conceptual content is taken to
mean that in order to have an experience, I need to possess the concepts that characterize
its content.
E. Schmidt (&)
Philosophisches Institut, Universita¨t des Saarlandes, 66123 Saarbru¨cken, Germany
e-mail: eva.schmidt@mx.uni-saarland.de
1 Some of the major players in the debate are Christopher Peacocke, Jose´ Bermu´dez, and Michael Tye on
the nonconceptualist side, and John McDowell and Bill Brewer on the conceptualist side (Brewer 1999;
McDowell 1994b; Bermu´dez 2003; Peacocke 1992; Tye 1995).
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As presented so far, what is at stake in the debate is whether possession of conceptual
abilities is required for a subject to undergo a perceptual experience. Byrne (2005) calls
nonconceptualism understood thus the ‘‘state view’’ and argues that the truth of the state
view has no bearing on whether the content of an experience has a conceptual structure or
not, i.e., on whether the ‘‘content view’’ should be accepted. For example, we can ascribe a
Fregean proposition (which is the standard example of a conceptually structured content)
to an experience even if the subject lacks the conceptual abilities characterizing this
content.
In my (forthcoming), I point out that what is relevant is not whether the subject pos-
sesses certain conceptual abilities, but whether she exercises them. I argue that if the
relevant conceptual abilities have to be exercised in undergoing a mental state, then it has
conceptual content. Vice versa, if no conceptual abilities have to be employed in under-
going a mental state, then its content is nonconceptual. This is not the place to present this
argument.
Instead, I will assume throughout that, according to conceptualism, the relevant con-
ceptual abilities have to be exercised in a perceptual experience and, consequently, that
experience has conceptual content.2 I will assume that the nonconceptualist holds that no
conceptual abilities need to be exercised in undergoing a perceptual experience and thus
also that its content is nonconceptual. That is, I will pit both the content and the state view
of nonconceptualism against both the content and the state view of conceptualism.
2 The Argument
The argument from objectivity3 that I discuss here is an argument in favor of conceptu-
alism. In this paper, I will elucidate the different steps of the argument and argue that it is
not a threat to nonconceptualism.
The argument consists of two steps. In the first step, the conceptualist attempts to show
that we cannot speak of content of a perceptual experience unless it represents an objective,
mind-independent world to the subject as objective (called ‘step one’ below). In the second
step, he argues that there can be no representation of the world to the subject as objective
by anything less than a mental state with a conceptual content (‘step two’). The conclusion
is that there can be no nonconceptual perceptual content—instead, it has to be conceptual.
To put it even more succinctly, the argument is: no conceptual structure, no objectivity; no
objectivity, no content.
Let’s turn to step one: Why does the conceptualist require perceptual content to be
objective? McDowell in particular is motivated by the Kantian image of blindness, a
blindness that might threaten perceptual experience: ‘‘To say that an experience is not blind
is to say that it is intelligible to its subject as purporting to be awareness of a feature of
2 McDowell, too, requires more than concept possession. According to him, however, conceptual abilities
have to be drawn on or actualized in perceptual experience. This way, he tries to capture that it is not under
the active control of the perceiver how conceptual abilities are operative in perceptual experience. I cannot
discuss the fine-grained distinction between exercising and actualizing conceptual abilities here. At any rate,
what is important is that McDowell and I agree that mere possession of the relevant concepts does not
guarantee that a mental state has conceptual content. Rather, these concepts have to be operative in
undergoing the experience.
3 The main proponent of the argument is McDowell (1994b). There are some passages in Brewer (1999)
dealing with the same ideas; otherwise, most of the literature consists in defenses of nonconceptualism
against the objection. See, e.g., Burge (2009, 2010); Peacocke (1992, 1994, 2001a, 2001b, 2003).
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objective reality: as a seeming glimpse of the world’’ (McDowell 1994b, 54).4 We
‘‘conceive experience as awareness, or at least seeming awareness, of a reality independent
of experience’’ (31). He holds that in perceptual experience, ‘‘the relevant conceptual
capacities are integrated into spontaneity at large, in a way that enables the subject to
understand experiences in which those conceptual capacities are drawn into operation as
glimpses, or at least seeming glimpses of the world: takings in, at least seemingly, of
aspects of a reality that goes beyond what is manifest in the experiences themselves.’’
(31f.)
Part of McDowell’s claim is the phenomenological observation that perceptual expe-
riences seem to confront us with a mind-independent world.5 They purport to represent a
reality that goes beyond experience itself, a reality that we can grasp in thought. As
subjects of perceptual experience, it strikes us not that we have certain raw feels, say, but
that we are confronted with a world external to and independent of us.
One part of the point is that talk of representation and empirical content is unintelligible
unless we presuppose that there is, or seems to be, something beyond the experience (viz.,
an objective world) that is represented. The other part is that genuine representation of the
world to the subject means that she appreciates (it is ‘‘intelligible’’ for her) that she is, or
seems to be, confronted with a mind-independent world. Experience purports to present the
world to the subject—it has to register with the subject that she is apparently confronted
with a certain way the world is.
From these quotes, three requirements on perceptual objectivity can be isolated for step
one—genuine perceptual content must be objective: (1) features of the mind-independent
world must be represented6; (2) they must be presented to the subject; for otherwise, she
would not be able to grasp that what is presented to her is apparently part of a larger reality,
and (3) they must be represented as objective. This last requirement captures McDowell’s
idea that subjects of perceptual experience take themselves to be confronted with a world
whose existence does not depend on their experience, that they appreciate the apparent fact
that their experiences present them with a mind-independent world.7
Step two consists in the claim that only conceptual content can be objective—only
conceptual states are capable of (apparently) presenting a mind-independent world to the
subject as objective. How does McDowell argue for this claim? According to him,
(A) experience can (apparently) present the world as objective to the subject only if it is
integrated into the subject’s overall system of concepts and beliefs, into her world-view as
of an objective world (32).8 (B) The required integration is possible only if experience has
conceptual content.
As to (A), we can see why integration into a world-view might play a role for perceptual
objectivity by considering the third element of objective perceptual content. Plausibly, the
world will be perceptually presented to the subject as objective only when integrated into a
4 From here on, all bare page references will be to McDowell (1994b).
5 He relies explicitly on phenomenological considerations in his (1994a).
6 Note that perceptual experience can misrepresent: Features of a mind-independent world may be repre-
sented where none are present.
7 While the world ‘‘is the bit of objective reality that is within her perceptual and practical reach’’ (116) for
subjects who are able to appreciate its objectivity, it is not there at all for animals who are unable to do so.
McDowell denies that such animals have experiences with representational content—instead, he ascribes
mere ‘‘perceptual sensitivity’’ to them (121).
8 I will leave out the ‘as of an objective world’ from now on. For McDowell, talk of a world-view already
implies that it is a view of a world as objective—otherwise, there could not be a world and a view of it. I will
follow him in his use of ‘‘world-view’’.
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web of beliefs such as that the world is mind-independent, that there is a distinction
between her consciousness and the world, or that the same reality can be experienced from
more than one perspective. To feel the appeal of this claim, you have to take seriously the
conceptualist’s worry about how perceptual experience could succeed in being more for a
subject than mere (non-representational) raw feels in the first place. McDowell’s answer is
that it can be a glimpse of mind-independent reality only against the background of the
subject’s understanding that it is such a glimpse.9
But how does this need for integration into a world-view connect to the claim (B) that
perceptual content must be conceptual? There are two ways to motivate the need for
conceptual content: First, the content of a perceptual experience, taken in its entirety, must
bear rational relations to belief contents to allow for the experience and its content to be
integrated with the subject’s beliefs and their contents; rational relations require conceptual
contents. Second, the integration can be achieved immediately via the elements consti-
tuting a perceptual content, but only if they are concepts. For only then can they be terms in
a conceptual repertoire presupposing an objective reality.
Let’s turn first to how the content of a perceptual experience, taken as a whole, can be
integrated into a world-view. What exactly are the purported rational relations between
(the contents of) perceptual experience and empirical belief? Perceived facts, via per-
ceptual experience, exert rational constraints on what is rational to believe, and the belief
system has to be constantly adjusted to the contents of the subject’s perceptual experience.
For instance, when I see, upon taking a closer look, that there is a dog in front of me, not
the sheep that appeared to be there originally, I have to abandon my belief that there is a
sheep in front of me to be rational. As per (A), in the opposite direction, the contents of our
beliefs concerning the mind-independent world (our world-view) shape the contents of our
experiences.
Rational relations in both directions are needed to create an integrated world-view,
which includes experiences whose content itself is shaped by the world-view so as to
represent the world to the subject as objective. If the relation between experience and belief
were only causal, for instance, the world would not be able immediately to strike the
perceiver as objective in experience. The best the subject might hope for is meta-beliefs to
the effect that particular perceptual experiences which cause certain beliefs are themselves
caused by certain features of an objective reality.10
What connects this to step two (B) is McDowell’s claim that only mental states with
conceptual content can be rationally related to beliefs (52). Following Davidson (1983/
2008), he holds that rational relations can only obtain between items with conceptual/
propositional content. Perceptual experience, conceived of as a state with nonconceptual
content, must remain outside the ‘‘space of reasons’’ (5)—the only relations that can obtain
between experience and belief on this picture are causal relations.
Putting things together, perceptual objectivity relies on the rational integration of entire
contents of perceptual experiences into the subject’s world-view, and rational integration
can only work on conceptual contents. So, perceptual objectivity presupposes that per-
ceptual experience has conceptual content.
9 Similar claims can be found in Strawson (1959) and Quine (1960). The nonconceptualist views of Evans
(1982) and Peacocke (1994, 1992) are also influenced by this requirement on objectivity. For a helpful
summary of the tradition and an interesting criticism, see Burge (2010, 2009).
10 McDowell would not even grant this much, for without rational integration, our beliefs cannot have
empirical content.
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The other way to achieve rational integration of a perceptual content into a world-view
is not through the relations between particular beliefs and particular experiences (and their
contents) as just described, but via the concepts constituting perceptual contents (29–36).
This is a matter of how the elements making up a perceptual content are related to the
perceiver’s world-view, as reflected by her conceptual repertoire. A perceiver’s overall
conceptual system incorporates the idea that she is faced with an objective world; her
empirical concepts are concepts as of an objective reality—they are concepts as of mind-
independent objects, relations, and properties. So her experience, if its content is consti-
tuted by concepts that are shaped by their relations to a conceptual system that presupposes
the mind-independence of the world, will represent the world as objective. This is so
because ‘‘the rational connections of the concept enter into shaping the content of the
appearance so that what appears to be the case is understood as fraught with implications
for the subject’s cognitive situation in the world’’ (32).
If perceptual content is nonconceptual, on the other hand, it is impossible for this kind
of intimate relation between a subject’s conceptual repertoire and her perceptual contents
to obtain: Since nonconceptual perceptual contents are not constituted by concepts, they
cannot be rationally integrated into the her world-view in virtue of their conceptual con-
stituents. They cannot be objective in this way. Thus, steps two (A) and two (B) are spelled
out as follows. (A) To represent the world as objective to the subject, the very elements
constituting the perceptual content in question must be incorporated into a world-view. But
(B), for a perceptual content’s elements to be so integrated, these elements must them-
selves be concepts, for otherwise they cannot be part of a conceptual repertoire that
presupposes a mind-independent world.
Let me conclude my discussion with a concise statement of the argument:
(Step one) A perceptual experience can have genuine content only if it represents the
world to the subject as objective.
(Step two (A)) A perceptual experience can represent the world to the subject as
objective only if it is rationally integrated into a world-view.
(Step two (B)) A perceptual experience can be rationally integrated into a world-view
only if its content is conceptual.
(Conclusion) A perceptual experience can have genuine content only if this content is
conceptual.
I will now discuss two objections to the argument. The first objection purports to show
that the subject can appreciate and thus perceive the world as objective (as required by the
conceptualist) without a belief- and concept-based world-view. The second objection
points us towards a weaker notion of objectivity that can provide for perceptual content
without invoking any further individual-level capacities.
3 The First Objection: No Need for a Belief-Based World-View
Plausibly, a subject’s beliefs are objective partly because they (and their contents) are
rationally integrated into a world-view and because the concepts constituting their contents
are elements of a web of concepts which is shaped by the presupposition that the world is
objective. Prima facie, it is appealing to transfer this picture to perceptual experience.
To test the plausibility of this transfer, let’s consider an entrenched solipsist’s perceptual
experience. The solipsist falsely believes that there is no external world and that there are
no objective facts about the world to know. She thinks that all there is is her mind, her
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experiences and her beliefs; she believes that there are only subjective facts, facts about
herself. According to her, perceptual experience does not present a mind-independent
environment to her—she has no world-view.11 She conceives of her perceptual experience
as constituted by qualia or raw feels that are not about anything outside of her mind.
Does her perceptual experience have a content? Does the objective, mind-independent
world seem to strike her in any way in perception, or does she just appear to be confronted
with subjective facts about herself? If the content of the solipsist’s perceptual experiences
is indeed determined by her overall belief system and conceptual repertoire with which her
experiences are integrated, one might expect them not to represent anything beyond her. In
particular, if perceptual experience represents a mind-independent world to the perceiver
only in virtue of its integration with her world-view, the solipsist’s perceptual experience
does not even purport to present her with an objective world out there—it does not seem to
her as though she is presented with a mind-independent world.
Yet leaving aside the conceptualist’s presuppositions, I think the most plausible story
we can tell about this confused individual is that her situation is somewhat parallel to that
of the informed perceiver when looking at the Mu¨ller-Lyer drawing: He knows that both
lines are equally long, but he cannot help but experience them as being of different lengths.
This is so because his perceptual experience purports to have empirical import, prior to and
at least partly independently of what he believes about the world.
The solipsist thinks she knows that there is no objective reality; but she cannot shake the
impression, in undergoing her experience, that there is an objective world that she per-
ceives. Again, the reason for this is that experience, all by itself, purports to be about an
objective world. The solipsist can go no further than to have a belief system and a web of
concepts as of a world consisting only of subjective facts about herself. Moreover, she can
try to take a certain attitude towards her perceptual experience and try to take it as nothing
but raw feels (for instance, imagine that she has what we would describe as a visual
experience as of a rock flying right at her face. She can try to convince herself that she is
merely experiencing some interesting visual qualia.). But this will not change the fact that
her perceptual experiences, prior to and independently of her solipsist assumptions, will
purport to present her with things in the objective world (correspondingly, she will feel the
strong urge to duck because there seems to be a rock coming at her).12
The conceptualist can try to accommodate my claims by saying that no one can ever be
a solipsist all the way to the ground level. He might argue that the content of any per-
ceiver’s experience is constituted by a special level of concepts that take hold of her
environment directly.13 He can concede that the subject cannot help the actualization of
these concepts in perception, and so she cannot help being a realist about the world at the
most primitive level. With this move, however, my opponent loses the apparent advantage
11 See footnote 8.
12 One might object that her urge to duck will be due to her anticipation of painful qualia, and nothing more.
But I do not think that this is plausible. Just as it is beyond the subject’s control that she will raise her foot
reflexively when stepping into a nail, so it is not under her control that she will duck in expectation of being
hit by a rock because her visual experience represents a rock to be flying at her face.
Plausibly, she will believe that it appears as though there is a rock flying at her face on the basis of her
experience. This goes to show that her experiences help determine what the solipsist believes. But on the
argument presented above, her beliefs should influence the content of her perceptual experiences as well—
her conviction that there is no external world to be represented should prevent her experience from making it
appear as though there is a rock flying in her direction in the first place.
13 Brewer (1999) and McDowell (1994b) could use their account of demonstrative perceptual content to
support this claim. The corresponding debate lies outside the scope of this paper.
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of his view that perceptual experience is objective because the concepts constituting its
content are part of a web of concepts presupposing an objective world, and because the
perceptual content is rationally integrated into a world-view. For the special basic concepts
involved in experience (and the experience itself), as they are conceived of now, are of an
objective reality independently of the subject’s world-view.
Alternatively, the conceptualist could deny that the die-hard solipsist’s perceptual ex-
perience is as of an objective reality. It only presents the subject with subjective facts about
her own experience. I have used an analogy with our lack of control over our experience in
the case of the Mu¨ller-Lyer illusion to discourage this move. Nonetheless, the conceptualist
may be willing to bite the bullet and hold that the solipsist’s perceptual experiences do not
appear to her to have any empirical import. Note that this insistence conflicts with further
plausible assumptions, such as that perceptual experience is transparent. Introspectively
focusing on my visual experience of a sheep, for instance, I seem to be confronted with an
external object (the sheep) and its properties. Further, it is impossible for me to pin down
any properties that appear to be properties of my experience rather than properties of the
sheep (see Crane 2011). Now, if the solipsist’s experiences do not even purport to confront
her with a mind-independent reality, it follows that they are not transparent, not even in the
weaker and uncontroversial sense that they seem to confront her with external objects.
Further, there is a tension here between two elements in the conceptualist’s view:
Between McDowell’s plausible insistence that, in experience, the perceiver finds herself
‘‘saddled with content’’ (McDowell 1994b, 10), i.e., that she has no control over what she
is confronted with perceptually, and the suggested consequence of his view, that by be-
coming a committed solipsist, she can cast off the apparent empirical import of her ex-
periences, which implies that it is up to her after all what she is confronted with in
experience.
So, we should look elsewhere to explain the objectivity of perceptual experience. That
experience plausibly represents the mind-independent world to the solipsist despite her
lack of a world-view shows that integration into a belief- and concept-based world-view is
not necessary for the objective import of perceptual experience. The solipsist case moti-
vates a rejection of step two (A), provided we understand world-views as concept- and
belief-based phenomena. This rejection can be complemented by introducing a less de-
manding kind of ‘‘world-view’’ into which experience needs to be integrated to be ob-
jective. I will discuss this option next.
The link between step one and step two of the argument from objectivity is provided by
the notion that perceptual experience presents the world to the subject as objective. This is
to say that the perceiver is not blind to the world—she has to take the world to be objective,
or appreciate the apparent mind-independence of the world in experience.
The view that I will present now concedes that perceptual content requires the subject’s
appreciation of the world as objective, but holds that this can be achieved without a belief-
or concept-based world-view. Rather, what is needed is the nonconceptual ability to build
up a cognitive map of one’s environment on the basis of perceptual experience.14
As stated above, on McDowell’s view, experience can present the world as objective to
the subject only when integrated into a world-view. In order to appreciate the fact that
perceptual experience represents the objective world to her, the subject has to understand
that the world is independent of her mind and of her perceptual perspective on the world.
14 Note that in the end, I will not endorse this view: I hold that not even this much is needed for experience
to have a content. I will get to this in the next section.
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The nonconceptualist alternative is exemplified by Peacocke’s (2003) view. He holds
that the subject has to be able to keep track of her changing position in her environment to
have genuinely spatial perceptual contents, but he provides an account of how this is
possible without a concept of objectivity. In Peacocke (2003, 319), he points out that the
resources for explaining how a subject can keep track of her position in space are provided
by the perceptual experience’s nonconceptual content itself, which Peacocke (1992) ac-
counts for in terms of scenario content. A scenario content is characterized by its origin, in
relation to which the perceived properties and relations are arranged along axes. For
instance, my visual experience of a sheep off to my left represents the sheep and its
properties, as well as other properties of my surroundings, at a certain distance and angle
along with axes with respect to me as the origin.
Building up from this, a subject can come to what Peacocke (2003) calls a noncon-
ceptual notion hier. The subject possesses hier if she represents the origin of scenario
contents as hier—if she represents things that bear relation R to the origin of the scenario
content as standing in R to hier. Moreover, she has to update the relations things bear to
hier as she moves around in space. When the subject moves and therefore the relation of a
perceived object to the origin of the scenario content changes from R to R’, she has to
update her representation of this object’s relation to hier from R to R’. For instance, when I
move closer to the sheep, I represent the sheep as moving closer to hier.
In this account, the subject possesses a cognitive map of her environment, in relation to
which she is able to update her own position. What is central to this account of objectivity
is a representation of the perceiver’s position as related to her immediate surroundings, a
representation that stays the same across changing perceptual experiences.
Let me be clear that hier is not a concept. One reason why not is that a subject can
possess hier without having any reflective-critical abilities that would be needed for her to
evaluate her mental contents and to consider whether she should take them at face value or
not. Hier can be had by a subject who can do no more than uncritically accept any
perceptual content she is presented with, as long as she is able to update hier in relation to
her perceived environment. So, this notion does not meet McDowell’s plausible criterion
on what it takes to possess a concept, viz. the self-critical ability to use the concept in
thought to revise one’s empirical beliefs in response to perceptual experience (McDowell
1994b, 49, 66).
Peacocke’s view is an example of how the appreciation of the world as objective can be
made possible without appealing to a concept- and belief-based world-view. It is an
attempt to capture what might seem right about step two (A) (of rational integration into a
world-view) in nonconceptual terms: A perceiver’s experiences are integrated into her
cognitive map of her environment. This cognitive map constitutes her grasp of the mind-
independence of her surroundings. It can be seen as a less demanding kind of world-view,
for it involves the integration of the perceiver’s experiences into one cognitive map of her
mind-independent environment.
Taken together with the fall-out from the solipsist case, the result is that perceptual
representation of the world to the subject as objective can be had without a belief- and
concept-based world-view, as long as the perceptual experience is integrated into a cog-
nitive map. So far, step one remains untouched, and step two (A) is modified so as to allow
for integration into a cognitive map as a way of being integrated into a world-view.
In contrast to the described strategy, I will argue in the following that the noncon-
ceptualist need not grant her opponent even this much. The subject’s appreciation of the
mind-independence of the world in terms of a cognitive map is not necessary for the
phenomenally conscious perceptual experience of adult humans. To prepare the ground for
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this, I will first present an alternative notion of objectivity which does away with the
perceiver’s appreciation of the world as objective.
4 The Second Objection: No Need for Presentation as Objective
I believe that everyone has to allow that perceptual objectivity in some sense is indeed
needed for genuine content. However, objectivity should not be conceived of in the de-
manding way suggested by the conceptualist. Recall his three elements of perceptual
objectivity: (1) Features of the mind-independent world must be represented; (2) they must
be presented to the subject; and (3) they must be represented as objective. Call the con-
ceptualist’s notion of objectivity
(Objectivity1) A perceptual experience is objective1 if and only if it represents objective
features of the world to the subject as objective.
The weaker notion of perceptual objectivity I propose is
(Objectivity2) A perceptual experience is objective2 if and only if it represents objective
features of the world to the subject.
In the next few paragraphs, I will elucidate the notion of objectivity2 and compare it
with the previously proposed notion of objectivity1.
The first element of perceptual objectivity that the nonconceptualist ought to accept is
that it should represent objective features of the world, for we cannot understand how
experience can have empirical content unless we assume that it takes hold of the objective
world (33/34). If we were to deny that experience represents the objective world, we would
thereby also deny that it has empirical content. It does not make sense to say that expe-
rience has representational content while denying that it represents something, and what it
represents is (at least in standard perceptual experience) what is or could be the case in the
world.
This can be further motivated by an appeal to the distinction between sensory states that
are sensitive to distal stimuli and ones that are sensitive merely to proximal stimuli (Proust
2000). For instance, the retina of the human eye is sensitive to changes in the intensity and
frequency of the light waves that strike the retina. But it does not represent anything
beyond these proximal stimuli, such as objects or properties at a certain distance from the
perceiver.
Human subjects, by contrast, can represent distal stimuli such as (features of) three-
dimensional objects at a distance from their perceptual organs, and they can represent them
as constant even as they themselves move around their environment. With this ability, we
get a distinction between states of the perceiver and states of the environment, between the
perceptual states themselves and what they represent, i.e., a distinction between mind and
mind-independent world.
Let me clarify that representation of constant three-dimensional objects at a distance is
not necessary for genuine perceptual content. In auditory experience, for instance, sounds
are represented. Plausibly, sounds are not three-dimensional objects. What is crucial for
perceptual objectivity is that certain constant features are represented such that they appear
to be a certain way independently of the position and states of the perceiver. In vision, this
is typically tied to representation of distal three-dimensional objects. But it is at least
conceivable that all that is represented to be out there are constant two-dimensional shapes,
independently of the situation of the perceiver.
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The second requirement on genuine content that the nonconceptualist should grant the
conceptualist is due to the fact that our topic is the content of phenomenally conscious
perceptual experience of adult humans. So, what we need are necessary conditions for
phenomenally conscious content. That is, we should accept the requirement that the subject
be presented with apparent features of her environment.
Perceptual experience takes place at the level of the individual, not at the level of one of
its parts—e.g., at the level of some perceptual module or system. It is the subject who is
phenomenally conscious of her surroundings, not one of her subsystems. Moreover, as
Burge (2010, 376) argues, perception is constitutively tied in with the individual’s agency
and with her specific perceptual perspective on the world. It should be common ground
between the conceptualist and the nonconceptualist that in perceptual experience, the
world strikes the perceiver as being in a certain way.
So, the nonconceptualist should not take issue with the first two elements of perceptual
objectivity as proposed by the conceptualist. The only thing that objectivity1 adds to
objectivity2, then, is the idea that the subject has to take the world to be constituted by
spatially arranged objects, on top of this (hence the ‘presents … her environment as
objective’). As explicated above, the subject’s appreciation of the mind-independence of
the world can be either in terms of a world-view or in terms of a (nonconceptual) cognitive
map.
I have already rejected the necessity of integration into a belief- and concept-based
world-view for genuinely objective content. But I still need to show that objectivity2 is a
genuine alternative to objectivity1, where the subject’s appreciation of the world as ob-
jective is spelled out in terms of the experience’s integration with her other experiences via
a cognitive map.
Here is why objectivity1 (supplied by the cognitive-map account) is not necessary for
perceptual experience to have a content. Imagine a subject with a severe case of antero-
grade amnesia. She has completely lost her short-term memory and is unable to remember
anything she perceives. At some point, she will have lost her ability to build up a cognitive
map of her surroundings and to locate herself on this map just because her short-term
memory is too bad to support a permanent representation of her environment through
which she moves. At this point, her perceptual experiences are not objective1 anymore.
Still, I find it highly counterintuitive to claim that any one of her perceptual experiences
fails to represent her environment. The more plausible description of her situation is that
she genuinely perceives her surroundings at any given moment; she simply lacks the short-
term memory to combine her perceptions into one persisting cognitive map. Her impair-
ment concerns her memory, not her ability to perceive the mind-independent world.
The problem for Peacocke might be solved by pointing out that the amnesia patient will
still have concepts of and beliefs about an objective world and that her perceptual expe-
riences will therefore still be embedded in a world-view. More generally, one might claim
that, for genuine perception, some sort of grasp of objectivity by the subject is necessary; it
is irrelevant whether this is conceptual, whether it is constituted by an ability to locate
oneself on a cognitive map of one’s environment, or both.
This is not convincing. Rather, the amnesiac case brings out a deeper question about the
requirement of representation to the subject as objective for perceptual content: Why
should we require anything more sophisticated of a perceiver with representational per-
ceptual experiences than just the ability to have an experience of her environment at a
particular time? Why is representation of features of an objective world to the subject
(without adding ‘as objective’) not good enough?
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More trouble for my position might be caused by Burge (2009, 2010). He suggests that
we need perceptual memory (and perceptual anticipation) for objective representation. If I
read him correctly, the subject (at the individual level) is required to have capacities for
memory and anticipation in order to perceive constant features of objects as such over
longer stretches of time.15
Burge’s point is related to the idea that the perceiver’s experience needs to be integrated
into a cognitive map of her environment for it to have genuine content—such a cognitive
map relies on the subject’s memory of her previous perceptual experiences to create an
integrated representation of her surroundings over time. This is needed for the subject to
appreciate her environment as objective, and thus for objectivity1. The question is whether
it is really necessary for the perceptual experience to have representational content.
To lend further support to my claim that additional individual-level capacities, memory
in particular, are not needed for perceptual experience with genuine content, let me add
another twist to the amnesiac case.
Imagine that, at t1, the amnesia patient is facing an apple, but she has no short-term
memory of her recent past. So her perceptual state (if I may call it that) which would, under
better circumstances, represent the apple, is not integrated into a cognitive map at this
point. If objectivity1 is needed for perceptual experience with representational content, the
amnesia patient does not have a content-bearing experience of the apple at t1.
Now imagine that exactly at t1, her capability to form short-term memories is
miraculously restored. As a consequence, when she is still facing the apple at t2 shortly
thereafter, she has a perceptual experience representing the apple to her. For with her short-
term memory restored, she now remembers her perceptual state at t1, so that her experience
at t2 is integrated into a cognitive map of her environment, including the apple.
What is very strange about this account is that—as described—the amnesiac now has a
content-bearing memory of her perceptual state at t1. Without it, she would not yet be able
to construct a cognitive map of her environment, and thus would not have an experience
representing the apple at t2. This suggests that, looking back from her situation at t2, her
perceptual state at t1 is an experience with phenomenally conscious content that presents
the apple to her. For how else could she remember what she perceived? But how can this
be the case if her perceptual state was not an experience presenting her with the apple at t1?
Excluding backwards causation, it either must have been a perceptual experience pre-
senting her with the apple originally, or the healed amnesia patient’s memory, at t2, of her
previous perceptual state as presenting her with an apple, must be mistaken. The defender
of objectivity1 cannot accept the first option, and I do not see how he could make the
second option work. For how could the amnesiac have a mistaken memory (with phe-
nomenally conscious content) of a perceptual state that was not phenomenally conscious,
and had no content presenting her with an apple, at the time? This is especially problematic
since the phenomenally conscious memory of this perceptual state, including its content,
supposedly partly constitutes the cognitive map that is needed to provide her experience at
t2 with a content—to enable this experience to present her with an apple.
So, the claim that no more than objectivity2 is needed for genuine perceptual content is
supported not only by the intuitive appeal of the claim that the amnesia patient’s perceptual
experience is not impaired by her memory loss. It has the added advantage of bypassing the
15 Burge (2009) appears to be ambiguous on the claims that the perceptual system or, respectively, the
individual, needs to have capacities such as the ability to track a body over time. I thank him for a helpful
e-mail on this topic.
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strange consequences of the amnesiac case for adherents of the cognitive-map account of
objectivity1.
In my discussion so far, I have tried to convince the reader that neither integration into a
belief- and concept-based world-view nor integration into a nonconceptual cognitive map
are required for a subject to have content-bearing perceptual experiences. The solipsist
case showed that the apparent empirical import of perceptual experience does not depend
on the subject’s view of the world as mind-independent. The amnesiac case showed that we
cannot count on a perceiver’s ability to remember her previous experiences and thus to
build up a cognitive map of her surroundings to explain how she can have experiences in
which the world appears to present itself to her.
So, apparently, neither the subject’s conceptual capacities nor her nonconceptual abil-
ities can be appealed to in an account of perceptual objectivity. Our perceptual experiences
present us with features of our environments independently of our appreciation of these
features as objective: no more than objectivity2 is needed for perceptual content.
This result naturally leads to the question of how perceptual experience comes to
represent the perceiver’s surroundings to her. Fully answering this question lies outside the
scope of this paper. However, let me add a few suggestions which direction an account of
perceptual content that does not appeal to further individual-level cognitive capacities
might take.
Think of Tye’s (1995) PANIC theory, according to which the phenomenal character of
experience is due to its nonconceptual content that is (among other things) poised to have
an impact on the subject’s central cognitive system. My suggestion is that perceptual
experience is objective2—it represents features of an objective world to the subject—if
there is a corresponding representational output (which already represents distal features of
the subject’s environment) of a perceptual module that is available to the central cognitive
system. The transformation from mere proximal stimulation to representation of distal
features takes place inside the perceptual system. No appeal to further cognitive abilities of
the individual is made.
Clearly, this suggestion would need an elaboration and a defense. Note, however, that
one advantage of explaining the emergence of perceptual content in terms of such sub-
individual level processes and structures is that this allows that the amnesiac has content-
bearing perceptual experiences. Her loss of short-term memory does not affect the work of
her perceptual modules. They can still output representations of distal objects and prop-
erties, which can be poised to have an impact on the central cognitive system. The am-
nesiac’s problem is that she cannot form new memories on the basis of what she
experiences. This is a deficit that lies outside the functioning of her perceptual system—she
is unable to remember what she just saw. So, she is unable to create a cognitive map on the
basis of her perceptual experience. Many other of her abilities that rely on her short-term
memory of perceptual experiences will be impaired as well (e.g., reaching for a hidden
object). But that the actual impact of her perceptual experiences on her beliefs and actions
will be limited makes no difference for whether the output from the perceptual system will
be poised to have an impact on her central cognitive system.16 For a discussion of the
distinction between individual and sub-individual levels of explanation, see Bermu´dez
(2005).
16 Note that Tye’s (1995, 7–10) explication of unilateral visual neglect is in the same spirit: He suggests that
a unilateral visual neglect patient has phenomenally conscious visual experiences in the ‘neglected’ part of
her visual field and that her real deficit is of a higher cognitive order—it is her inability to attend to and
notice what she experiences.
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Consequently, we should accept objectivity2, not objectivity1, as a necessary condition
on perceptual content. Step one of the argument from objectivity is untenable—content-
bearing perceptual experience need not present the world to the subject as objective; no
appreciation of the mind-independence of the world is needed. What is needed for expe-
rience to have genuine content is that it represents the world to the subject. I have argued
that we cannot appeal to her individual-level capacities to explain how perceptual expe-
rience can represent the world, and suggested that we should look to the subject’s sub-
individual cognitive organization instead.
5 Conclusion
I started out by presenting the objection from objectivity: Perceptual content must repre-
sent the world to the subject as objective; it can do so only if it is rationally integrated into
a world-view, and it can be integrated into a world-view only if it is conceptual. So
perceptual content must be conceptual, and nonconceptualism is false.
To defend nonconceptualism, I presented two attacks on different steps of the argument.
The first objection I presented is directed at step two (A), the claim that rational integration
into a (belief- and concept-based) world-view is necessary for perceptual objectivity. The
solipsist case shows that even a subject who lacks such a world-view can have perceptual
experience apparently presenting the subject with an objective world. I provided an al-
ternative account of what is needed for perception of the world as objective, viz., inte-
gration of perceptual experiences into a cognitive map of her environment.
Second, I objected to step one: representation of the world as objective is not required
for perceptual experience to have a content—not even if this takes the shape of the
perceptual experience’s being integrated into a (nonconceptual) cognitive map. I argued
that an amnesiac’s memory loss does not affect her perceptual experience itself, even if it
impairs her ability to build up a cognitive map. Moreover, I pointed out that requiring
possession of a cognitive map leads to strange consequences if the amnesiac is healed.
Apparently, a perceptual state that did not have a representational content at the time can
be the source of a genuine content-bearing memory of what the perceiver was not per-
ceptually confronted with originally.
I conclude that the argument from objectivity cannot support conceptualism. On my
view, the nonconceptualist should not grant that perceptual content presupposes the sub-
ject’s ability to appreciate the mind-independence of the world in any sense. Rather, the
subject has a content-bearing perceptual experience only if the world is present to her in
perception. In order to elucidate this claim, we do not have to appeal to further individual-
level capacities. Instead, I suggested, we need a sub-individual level account of how the
perceptual system generates representations of a mind-independent world that are poised to
influence the central cognitive system.
It is likely that this account will not satisfy my conceptualist opponent. His fear of the
blindness of perceptual experience calls for the subject to understand that she is confronted
with a mind-independent world. An appeal to sub-individual processes will not be able to
assuage his fear.
The conceptualist’s worry is caused by his misconception of his and the nonconcep-
tualist’s dialectical situation. What motivates him is the specter of a perceptual experience
that does not present the subject with the world around her, but with raw feels, from which
she is supposed to draw conclusions about her surroundings. It is admittedly impossible to
construct representational experiences from this starting-point. But this is not the
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nonconceptualist’s view. The nonconceptualist assumes that experience already comes
with representational content. I have suggested that, in order to understand how this is
possible, we should turn to the sub-individual processes investigated by cognitive
scientists.17
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